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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Privilege Tax-Temporary Use of Rooms folr
Solicitation of Sales in Interstate Commerce.
A North Carolina statute imposes an annual privilege tax of $250
upon "Every person, firm, or corporation, not being a regular retail
merchant in the state of North Carolina, who shall display samples,
goods, wares, or merchandise in any hotel room, or in any house rented
or occupied temporarily, for the purpose of securing orders for the re-
tail sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise so displayed ...... Plaintiff,
a New York corporation, rented for several days a room in a Winston-
Salem hotel for the display of samples, and thereby secured retail
orders for merchandise to be shipped from New York. Since plaintiff
was not a regular retail merchant in the state, a tax was assessed against
it under this statute. In an action to recover the tax paid under protest,
the Court held that this was not a direct and undue burden on interstate
commerce, but that the activity was a preliminary and incidental one
which transpired prior to the beginning of the flow of events which con-
stitutes the movement of goods in interstate commerce.2
A tax imposed by a state, or a municipal subdivision thereof, may
be invalidated as an improper exercise of power with respect to inter-
state commerce by reason of the fact either that the tax discriminates
against the citizens or products of another states or that the tax im-
poses a direct burden upon a transaction in interstate commerce. 4 The
purpose of the statute in the principal case, and the actual result of its
application, may be to discriminate against wares displayed by extra-
state merchants, but the act is not so phrased. Its language, taken
literally, imposes -the tax upon the privilege of displaying any wares,
regardless of their origin.5
The Supreme Court of the United States has, in numerous decisions,
beginning with the case of Robbins v,. Shelby County Taxing District,0
held consistently that a license or privilege tax upon persons soliciting
orders for goods to be shipped in interstate commerce is a direct burden
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880 (51) (e) (a subsequent section
provides that a like levy may be imposed by the county or municipality wherein
the activity takes place).
'Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 216 N. C. 114, 3 S. E. (2d) 292 (1939).3 Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, 26 L. ed. 103 (1880) ; O'Connell v. Konto-john, 131 Fla. 783, 179 So. 802 (1938).
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30
L. ed. 694 (1887).
' But it would seem that the provision of the statute which excludes all regular
retail merchants in the state might be susceptible of the construction that it ex-
empts every resident of North Carolina, because, by engaging in the taxed activity
he necessarily becomes a regular retail merchant in the state. The adoption of
such a construction would seem to result in discrimination against non-residents.
"120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30 L. ed. 694 (1887).
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upon such commerce, 7 even though the seller has a fixed place of busi-
ness in the state where the orders are solicited.8
Without finding any direct authority to sustain the tax, the North
Carolina court relied largely upon the recent trend by the judiciary
toward a ". . . broadening of the states' taxing power over matters
touching the fringe of the garment of interstate commerce." As pointed
out in a recent law review article,' 0 this trend has been especially pro-
nounced in sales and use tax cases. In Helson v. Kentucky," an early
use tax case, the United States Supreme Court declared that a state may
not tax the use of an article employed in interstate commerce. How-
ever, in subsequent decisions, this rule has been greatly relaxed to per-
mit the levy of taxes imposing as great a burden upon interstate
commerce. The Court has upheld a license tax on the business of sell-
ing gasoline12 and a privilege tax upon the sale, storage, or distribution
of gasoline, where the purchasers and the owners made use of it solely
in interstate commerce.' 3 A tax upon the privilege of transporting
motor vehicles over the highways for resale' 4 and a tax upon goods
brought into the state to be installed upon interstate transportation
equipment' 5 have also been sustained. These taxes were held not to be
a direct burden on interstate commerce, for they were imposed upon
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30
L. ed. 694 (1887) ; Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502, 7 Sup. Ct. 655, 30 L. ed.
699 (1887) ; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, 9 Sup. Ct. 1, 32 L. ed. 368 (1888);
Stoutenburg v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup. Ct. 256, 32 L. ed. 637 (1889);
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829, 38 L. ed. 719 (1894) ; Stock-
ard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct. 576, 46 L. ed. 785 (1902); Caldwell v.
North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 23 Sup. Ct. 229, 47 L. ed. 336 (1903); Norfolk &
Western R. R. v. Sims, 191 U. S. 441, 24 Sup. Ct. 151, 48 L. ed. 254 (1903);
Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 27 Sup. Ct. 159, 51 L. ed. 295 (1906) ;
Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124, 30 Sup. Ct. 649, 54 L. ed. 965 (1910) ; Cren-
shaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 33 Sup. Ct. 294, 57 L. ed. 565 (1913) ; Rogers
v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 401, 33 Sup. Ct. 298, 57 L. ed. 569 (1913); Stewart v.
Michigan, 232 U. S. 665, 34 Sup. Ct. 476, 58 L. ed. 786 (1914) ; Davis v. Virginia,
236 U. S. 697, 35 Sup. Ct. 479, 59 L. ed. 795 (1915); Western Oil Refining Co.
v. Lipscomb; 244 U. S. 346, 37 Sup. Ct. 623, 61 L. ed. 1181 (1917) ; Real Silk
Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525, 69 L. ed. 982 (1925).
But cf. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist, 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810, 36
L. ed. 601 (1892).
' Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct 576, 46 L. ed. 785 (1902);
Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178, 35 Sup. Ct. 403, 59 L. ed. 527 (1915).
'Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 216 N. C. 114, 118, 3 S. E. (2d) 292, 296 (1939).
10 Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays
Its Way (1938) 38 COL. L. Rav. 49.
11279 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 279, 73 L. ed. 683 (1929).
"Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 285 U. S. 147, 52
Sup. Ct. 340. 76 L. ed. 673 (1932).
"Nashville, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77
L. ed. 730 (1933) ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct.
591, 77 L. ed. 1155 (1933).
"Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407, 56 Sup. Ct. 756, 80 L. ed. 1245 (1936).
15 Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 389, 83 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 352 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, - U. S. -, 59
Sup. Ct. 396, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 369 (1939).
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property which had not yet begun or had ceased to be used in interstate
commerce. 6 The so-called compensating use taxes reach the same re-
sult, economically, as the imposition of a tax upon the interstate sale
itself, since the very purpose of the tax is to destroy the advantage of
buying tax-free goods in a state having no sales tax.17 The approval
given to such taxes by the courts represents not only a modification of
the rule as to what constitutes a direct burden on interstate commerce,
but also as to what constitutes discrimination against such commerce.
The Court in the instant case sought to liken the activity of the
plaintiff to an incident transpiring before interstate commerce began,
and relied upon the trend of the judiciary to declare such preliminary
action as separable from the interstate transaction itself. But, by the
very terms of the statute, the activity subjected to the tax was the actual
solicitation of orders for an interstate sale, which has been held to be a
part of the commerce itself, and not preliminary to, or separable from,
such commerce.' 8
Conceding the fact that the courts have materially expanded their
definitions of what constitutes activity prior or subsequent to, and
separable from, the interstate transaction itself, could a state impose a
tax upon billboard advertisements of a product which could be bought
only from an extrastate seller, or upon the display of goods by an agent
who had not the power to take orders, or upon the distribution of sam-
ples of goods with order blanks attached? An affirmative answer to
these questions may find some support in the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,'9
where it held valid a privilege tax based upon the gross receipts from
the sale of advertising space by newspapers and magazines where some
of the advertisements were procured from extrastate advertisers and
the publication was circulated in interstate commerce.
The Court sought further to sustain the levy upon the ground that
it is a "use tax" imposed upon the use of North Carolina property.
The tax cannot properly be classified as a "use tax", for it is a tax upon
the interstate commerce itself rather than upon the use of property
prior or subsequent to its employment in interstate commerce. Further-
more, the tax cannot be designated as a "use tax" for the reason that the
"' In these cases the 'court expressly found that there was no discrimination
against interstate commerce, either because the levy was upon all property of that
class within the state, or, if it was an imposition upon property purchased in an
extra-state market, because the use tax was complemental to the state sales tax.
S7An able discussion of sales and use taxes is embodied in Warren & Schles-
inger, loc. cit. supra note 10.18 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 497, 7 Sup. Ct. 592,
596, 30 L. ed. 694, 697 (1887) (where the court said: ". . . to tax the sale of such
goods, or the offer to sell them, before they are brought into the state, .... seems
to us clearly a tax on interstate commerce itself").
" 303 U. S. 250, 58 Sup. Ct. 546, 82 L. ed. 823 (1938).
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classification upon which the tax is based is the use of the room for the
purpose of displaying goods and securing orders for interstate sales;
and, therefore, the tax is, in reality, one upon the privilege of selling
rather than upon the privilege of use.
The tax having been shown to fall within the classification of a
privilege tax, 20 the rule laid down in the Robbins case2 1 and its suc-
cessors22 would seem applicable to invalidate it as being a direct and
undue burden upon interstate commerce. Recent decisions have modi-
fied the rule of the Robbins case as to what constitutes an interstate
sale. Banker Brothers v. Pennsylvania2 3 apparently limited the appli-
cation of the rule to cases where the out-of-state manufacturer or his
agent makes the sale; and Wiloil Corporation v. Pennsylvania held that
to constitute an interstate sale the contract must require interstate trans-
portation.24  Despite the modifications embodied in these decisions it
seems that the principal case does not fall within their scope, and must,
therefore, be governed by the rule as originally laid down. The Su-
preme Court in so recent a case as Southern Pacific v. Gallagher,25
citing the Robbins case, reiterated the rule that "A license tax on sales
by samples burdens one selling only goods from other states."
. MARSHALL V. YOUNT.
Federal Jurisdiction-Courts-Acquiring Jurisdiction by
Attachment of Nonresident's Property and
Constructive Service.
Originating with Toland v. Sprague,' an unbroken line of Supreme
Court decisions 2 have decreed that a federal court cannot acquire orig-
inal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the district in which the court is
20 The Revenue Act of 1937, of which this tax is a part, classifies it as a
privilege tax.
-" Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30
L. ed. 694 (1887).
22 See note 7, supra.
2222 U. S. 210, 32 Sup. Ct. 38, 56 L. ed. 168 (1911) (Banker Bros. of Penn-
sylvania kept no cars in stock, but sold by the use of demonstrators' cars man-
ufactured in New York. Purchasers contracted with Banker Bros. to buy cars
and pay the freight from New York, and received a warranty from the manufac-
turer. Banker Bros. accepted the drafts drawn on them by the manufacturer,
received the cars, and delivered them -to the purchasers. The Pennsylvania 2%
general sales tax was held applicable to such sales).
24 294 U. S. 169, 55 Sup. Ct. 358, 79 L. ed. 838 (1935) (a tax'of 3 cents per
gallon on fuels sold and delivered by distributors in Pennsylvania was held to
apply to a Pennsylvania corporation taking orders through agents and shipping
from Delaware to purchasers in Pennsylvania); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mc-
Goldrick, 279 N. Y. 184, 18 N. E. (2d) 25 (1938) (to the same effect).2 5
-U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 389, 392, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 352, 355 (1939).
112 Pet. 300, 9 L. ed. 1093 (U,. S. 1836).
2 Ex parte Des Moines & M. Ry., 103 U. S. 794, 26 L. ed. 461 (1880) ; Laborde
v. Ubarri, 214 U. S. 173, 29 Sup. Ct. 552, 53 L. ed. 955 (1909); Big Vein Coal
Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31, 33 Sup. Ct. 694, 57 L. ed. 1053 (1913).
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